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Abstract. We introduce quantitative reductions, a novel technique for structuring the space of
quantitative games and solving them that does not rely on a reduction to qualitative games. We
show that such reductions exhibit the same desirable properties as their qualitative counterparts
and additionally retain the optimality of solutions. Moreover, we introduce vertex-ranked games as
a general-purpose target for quantitative reductions and show how to solve them. In such games,
the value of a play is determined only by a qualitative winning condition and a ranking of the
vertices.
We provide quantitative reductions of quantitative request-response games to vertex-ranked games,
thus showing ExpTime-completeness of solving the former games. Moreover, we reduce quantita-
tive Muller games to vertex-ranked games, yielding a new proof of ExpTime-membership of the
problem of solving the former games. Furthermore, we exhibit the usefulness and flexibility of
vertex-ranked games by showing how to use such games to compute fault-resilient strategies for
safety specifications. This work lays the foundation for a general study of fault-resilient strategies
for more complex winning conditions.
1 Introduction
The study of quantitative infinite games has garnered great interest lately, as they allow for a much more
fine-grained analysis and specification of reactive systems than classical qualitative games [5–7,15,18,29,
30]. While there exists previous work investigating quantitative games, the approaches to solving them
usually rely on ad-hoc solutions that are tailor-made to the considered winning condition. Moreover,
quantitative games are usually solved by reducing them to a qualitative game in a first step, hardcoding
a certain value of interest during the reduction. In particular, to the best of our knowledge, no general
framework for the analysis of such games that is analogous to the existing one for qualitative games has
been developed. In this work, we introduce such a framework that disentangles the study of quantitative
games from that of qualitative ones.
Qualitative infinite games have been applied successfully in the verification and synthesis of reactive
systems [1–3, 8]. They have given rise to a multitude of algorithms that ascertain system correctness
and that synthesize correct-by-construction systems. In such a game, two players, called Player 0 and
Player 1, move a token in a directed graph. After infinitely many moves, the resulting sequence of
vertices is evaluated and one player is declared the winner of the play. For example, in a qualitative
request-response game [27], the goal for Player 0 is to ensure that every visit to a vertex denoting some
request is eventually followed by a visit to a vertex denoting an answer to that request. In order to
solve qualitative games, i.e., to determine a winning strategy for one player, one often reduces a complex
game to a potentially larger, but conceptually simpler one. For example, in a multi-dimensional request-
response game, i.e., in a request-response game in which there exist multiple conditions that can be
requested and answered, one stores the set of open requests and demands that every request is closed at
infinitely many positions. As this is a Bu¨chi condition, which is much simpler than the request-response
condition, one is able to reduce request-response games to Bu¨chi games.
In recent years the focus of research has shifted from the study of qualitative games, in which one
player is declared the winner of a given play, to that of quantitative games, in which the resulting play is
assigned some value or cost. Such games allow modeling systems in which, for example, requests have to
be answered within a certain number of steps [7,11,16,18,19], systems with one or more finite resources
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which may be drained and charged [4,9,10,26], or scenarios in which each move incurs a certain cost for
either player [15, 30].
In general, Player 0 aims to minimize the cost of the resulting play, i.e., to maximize its value, while
Player 1 seeks to maximize the cost, thus minimizing the value. In a quantitative request-response game,
for example, it is the goal of Player 0 to minimize the number of steps between requests and their
corresponding answers. The typical questions asked in the context of such games are “Does there exist
an upper bound on the time between requests and responses that Player 0 can ensure?” [11, 18, 19, 25],
“Can Player 0 ensure an average cost per step greater than zero?” [30], “What is the minimal time
between requests and responses that Player 0 can ensure?” [29], or “What is the minimal average level
of the resource that Player 0 can ensure without it ever running out?” [4]. The former two questions can
be seen as boundedness questions, while the latter two are asking for optimal solutions.
Such decision problems are usually solved by fixing some bound b on the cost of the resulting plays
and subsequently reducing the quantitative game to a qualitative one, hardcoding the fixed b in the
process. If the cost of the resulting play is below b, then Player 0 is declared the winner. For example,
in order to determine the winner in a quantitative request-response game as described above for some
bound b, we construct a Bu¨chi game in which every time a request is opened, a counter for that request
is started which counts up to the bound b and is reset if the request is answered. Once any counter
exceeds the value b, we move to a terminal position indicating that Player 0 has lost. We then require
that every counter is inactive infinitely often, which is again a Bu¨chi condition and thus much simpler
than the original quantitative request-response condition. Player 0 wins the resulting game if and only
if she can ensure that every request is answered within at most b steps.
Such reductions are usually specific to the problem being addressed. Furthermore, they immediately
abandon the quantitative aspect of the game under consideration, as the bound is hardcoded during the
first step of the analysis. Thus, even when only changing the bound one is interested in, the reduction
has to be recomputed and the resulting qualitative game has to be solved from scratch. In our request-
response example, if one is interested in checking whether Player 0 can ensure every request to be
answered within at most b′ 6= b steps, one constructs a new Bu¨chi game for the bound b′. This game is
then solved independently of the one previously computed for the bound b.
In this work, we lift the concept of reductions for qualitative games to quantitative games. Such
quantitative reductions enable the study of a multitude of optimization problems for quantitative games
in a way similar to decision problems for qualitative games. When investigating quantitative request-
response games using quantitative reductions, for example, we only compute a single, simpler quantitative
game and subsequently check this game for a winning strategy for Player 0 for any bound b. If she has
such a strategy in the latter game, the quantitative reduction yields a strategy for her satisfying the
same bound in the former one.
In general, we retain the intuitive property of reductions for qualitative games: The properties of a
complex quantitative game can be studied by investigating a potentially larger, but conceptually simpler
quantitative game.
Contributions We present the first framework for reductions between quantitative games and we provide
vertex-ranked games as general-purpose targets for such reductions. Moreover, we show tight bounds on
the complexity of solving vertex-ranked games with respect to a given bound.
Finally, we provide two examples illustrating the use of the concepts introduced in this work: First,
we define quantitative request-response games and solve them using quantitative reductions to vertex-
ranked games. Second, we illustrate the versatility of vertex-ranked games by using them to compute
fault-resilient strategies for safety games with faults.
After introducing qualitative and quantitative games formally in Section 2, we define quantitative
reductions in Section 3 and show that they provide a mechanism to solve a quantitative game with
respect to a given bound: If a game G can be reduced to a game G′, then we can use a strategy for
Player 0 that minimizes the cost of plays in G′ to construct a strategy for her which minimizes the cost
of plays in G.
In Section 4, we define vertex-ranked games, very general classes of quantitative games that can be
used as targets for quantitative reductions. The quantitative condition of such games is quite simple, as
the cost of a play is determined only by a qualitative winning condition and a ranking of the vertices of
the game. If the resulting play is winning according to the qualitative condition, then its cost is given by
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the highest rank visited at all or visited infinitely often, depending on the particular variant of vertex-
ranked games. Otherwise, the value of the play is infinite. We show that solving such vertex-ranked
games is as hard as solving the underlying qualitative winning condition.
Finally, in Section 5 we provide examples of the versatility of vertex-ranked games: First, we define and
solve request-response games with costs via quantitative reductions, showing ExpTime-completeness of
the problem of solving the former class of games. Second, we reduce quantitative Muller games as defined
by McNaughton [21] to vertex-ranked safety games via quantitative reductions, obtaining a novel proof of
ExpTime-membership of solving quantitative Muller games. Third, we discuss how to use vertex-ranked
games to compute fault-resilient strategies in safety games with faults. In such games, after Player 0 has
picked a move, say to vertex v, a fault may occur, which overrides the choice of Player 0 and the game
continues in vertex v′ 6= v instead. By using vertex-ranked games, we are able to compute strategies that
are resilient against as many faults as possible.
2 Preliminaries
We first define notions that are common to both qualitative and quantitative games. Afterwards, we
recapitulate the standard notions for qualitative games before defining quantitative games and lifting
the notions for qualitative games to the quantitative case.
We denote the non-negative integers by N and define [n] = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} for every n ≥ 1. Also,
we define ∞ > n for all n ∈ N and N∞ = N ∪ {∞}. An arena A = (V, V0, V1, E, vI) consists of a
finite, directed graph (V,E), a partition (V0, V1) of V into the positions of Player 0 and Player 1, and
an initial vertex vI ∈ V . The size of A, denoted by |A|, is defined as |V |. A play in A is an infinite
path ρ = v0v1v2 · · · through (V,E) starting in vI . To rule out finite plays, we require every vertex to be
non-terminal.
A strategy for Player i is a mapping σ : V ∗Vi → V that satisfies (v, σ(piv)) ∈ E for all pi ∈ V ∗, v ∈ Vi.
We say that σ is positional if σ(piv) = σ(v) for every pi ∈ V ∗, v ∈ Vi. A play v0v1v2 · · · is consistent with
a strategy σ for Player i, if vj+1 = σ(v0 · · · vj) for all j with vj ∈ Vi.
A memory structure M = (M,mI ,Upd) for an arena (V, V0, V1, E, vI) consists of a finite set M
of memory states, an initial memory state mI ∈ M , and an update function Upd: M × V → M . We
extend the update function to finite play prefixes in the usual way: Upd+(vI) = mI and Upd
+(piv) =
Upd(Upd+(pi), v) for play prefixes pi ∈ V + and v ∈ V . A next-move function Nxt : Vi ×M → V for
Player i has to satisfy (v,Nxt(v,m)) ∈ E for all v ∈ Vi, m ∈ M . It induces a strategy σ for Player i
with memory M via σ(v0 · · · vj) = Nxt(vj ,Upd
+(v0 · · · vj)). A strategy is called finite-state if it can be
implemented by a memory structure. We define |M| = |M |. In a slight abuse of notation, the size |σ| of
a finite-state strategy is the size of a memory structure implementing it.
An arena A = (V, V0, V1, E, vI) and a memory structure M = (M,mI ,Upd) for A induce the ex-
panded arenaA×M = (V ×M,V0×M,V1×M,E
′, (vI ,mI)), whereE
′ is defined via ((v,m), (v′,m′)) ∈ E′
if and only if (v, v′) ∈ E and Upd(m, v′) = m′. Every play ρ = v0v1v2 · · · in A has a unique extended
play extM(ρ) = (v0,m0)(v1,m1)(v2,m2) · · · in A×M defined by m0 = mI and mj+1 = Upd(mj , vj+1),
i.e., mj = Upd
+(v0 · · · vj). We omit the index M if it is clear from the context. The extended play of a
finite play prefix in A is defined analogously.
Let A be an arena and let M1 = (M1,m1I ,Upd1) and M2 = (M2,m
2
I ,Upd2) be memory struc-
tures for A and for A ×M1, respectively. We define M1 ×M2 = (M1 ×M2, (m1I ,m
2
I),Upd), where
Upd((m1,m2), v) = (m
′
1,m
′
2) if Upd1(m1, v) = m
′
1 and Upd2(m2, (v,m
′
1)) = m
′
2. Via a straightforward
induction and in a slight abuse of notation we obtain Upd+M2(Upd
+
M1
(pi)) = Upd+M1×M2(pi) for all finite
plays pi, where we identify (v,m1,m2) = ((v,m1),m2) = (v, (m1,m2)).
2.1 Qualitative Games
A qualitative game G = (A,Win) consists of an arena A with vertex set V and a set Win ⊆ V ω of
winning plays for Player 0. The set of winning plays for Player 1 is V ω \Win. As our definition of games
is very general, the infinite object Win may not be finitely describable. If it is, however, in a slight abuse
of notation, we define |G| as the sum of |A| and the size of a description of Win.
A strategy σ for Player i is a winning strategy for i in G = (A,Win) if all plays consistent with σ are
winning for i. If Player i has a winning strategy, then we say she wins G. Solving a game amounts to
determining its winner, if one exists. A game is determined if one player has a winning strategy.
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2.2 Quantitative Games
Quantitative games extend the classical model of qualitative games. In a quantitative game, plays are
not partitioned into winning and losing plays, but rather they are assigned some measure of quality. We
keep this definition very general in order to encompass many of the already existing models. In Section 4,
we define concrete examples of such games and show how to solve them optimally.
A quantitative game G = (A,Cost) consists of an arena A with vertex set V and a cost-function
Cost: V ω → N∞ for plays. Similarly to the winning condition in the qualitative case, Cost is an infinite
object. If it is finitely describable, we, again slightly abusively, define the size |G| of G as the sum of |A|
and the size of a description of Cost. A play ρ in A is winning for Player 0 in G if Cost(ρ) <∞.1 Winning
strategies, the winner of a game, and solving a game are defined as in the qualitative case.
We extend the cost-function over plays to strategies by defining Cost(σ) = supρCost(ρ) and Cost(τ) =
infρCost(ρ), where ρ ranges over the plays consistent with the strategy σ for Player 0 and over the plays
consistent with the strategy τ for Player 1, respectively. Moreover, we say that a strategy σ for Player 0
(Player 1) is optimal if its cost is minimal (maximal) among all strategies for her (him).
For every strategy σ for Player 0, Cost(σ) <∞ implies that σ is winning for Player 0. However, the
converse does not hold true: Each play consistent with some strategy σ may have finite cost, while for
every n ∈ N there exists a play ρ consistent with σ with Cost(ρ) ≥ n. Dually, a strategy τ for Player 1
has Cost(τ) =∞, if and only if τ is winning for him.
Player 0 wins G with respect to b if she has a strategy σ with Cost(σ) ≤ b. Dually, if Player 1 has
a strategy τ with Cost(τ) > b, then he wins G with respect to b. Solving a quantitative game G with
respect to b amounts to deciding whether or not Player 0 wins G with respect to b.
If Player 0 has a strategy σ with Cost(σ) ≤ b, then for all strategies τ for Player 1 we have Cost(τ) ≤
b. Dually, if Player 1 has a strategy τ with Cost(τ) > b, then for all strategies σ for Player 0 we
have Cost(σ) > b. We say that a quantitative game is determined if for each b ∈ N, either Player 0 has
a strategy with cost at most b, or Player 1 has a strategy with cost strictly greater than b.
We say that b ∈ N is a cap of a quantitative game G if Player 0 winning G implies that she has a
strategy with cost at most b. A cap b for a game G is tight if it is minimal.
3 Quantitative Reductions
Before defining quantitative reductions, we first recall the definition of qualitative ones. Let G = (A,Win)
and G′ = (A′,Win′) be qualitative games. We say that G is reducible to G′ via the memory structureM
for A if A′ = A ×M and if ρ ∈ Win if and only if ext(ρ) ∈ Win′. Then, Player 0 wins G if and only if
she wins G′. Moreover, if σ′ is a winning strategy for Player 0 in G′ that is implemented by M′, then a
winning strategy for her in G is implemented by M×M′.
We now define quantitative reductions as an analogous technique for the study of quantitative games
and show that they exhibit the same properties as qualitative reductions. Intuitively, given two quanti-
tative games G and G′, we aim to say that G is reducible to G′ if plays in one game can be translated into
plays in the other, retaining their cost along the transformation. In fact, two such associated plays do
not need to carry identical cost, but it suffices that the order on plays induced by their cost is retained.
To capture this intuition, we introduce b-correction functions. Let b ∈ N∞. A function f : N∞ → N∞
is a b-correction function if
– for all b′1 < b
′
2 < b we have f(b
′
1) < f(b
′
2),
– for all b′ < b we have f(b′) < f(b), and
– for all b′ ≥ b we have f(b′) ≥ f(b).
For b = ∞ these requirements degenerate to demanding that f is strictly monotonic, which in turn
implies f(∞) = ∞ and f(b) 6= ∞ for all b 6= ∞. Dually, if b = 0, we only require that f(0) bounds the
values of f(b) from below. As an example, the function capb, which is defined as capb(b
′) = min{b, b′}
for b′ 6=∞ and capb(∞) =∞ is a b-correction function for all parameters b ∈ N∞.
1 In order to simplify the presentation, we only consider the case in which Player 0 aims to minimize the cost
of a play. All concepts in this work can, however, be easily adapted to the dual case in which Player 0 aims to
maximize the cost of a play.
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Let G = (A,Cost) and G′ = (A′,Cost′) be quantitative games, let M be some memory structure
for A, let b ∈ N∞, and let f : N∞ → N∞ be some function. We say that G is b-reducible to G′ via M
and f if
– A′ = A×M,
– f is a b-correction function,
– Cost′(ext(ρ)) = f(Cost(ρ)) for all plays ρ of A with Cost(ρ) < b, and
– Cost′(ext(ρ)) ≥ f(b) for all plays ρ of A with Cost(ρ) ≥ b.
We write G ≤bM,f G
′ in this case. Moreover, we use capb as a “default” function: If f = capb, we omit
stating f explicitly and write G ≤bM G
′. The penultimate condition implies that for each play ext(ρ)
in A′ with Cost′(ext(ρ)) ≤ f(b) there exists some b′ such that Cost′(ext(ρ)) = f(b′).
Quantitative reductions are downwards-closed with respect to the parameter b: If G ≤bM,f G
′ for
some b ∈ N∞ and b′ ≤ b, then G ≤b
′
M,f G
′. Moreover, similarly to the case of qualitative reductions,
quantitative reductions are transitive.
Theorem 1. Let G1,G2,G3 be quantitative games such that G1 ≤
b1
M1,f1
G2 ≤
b2
M2,f2
G3 for some b1, b2 ∈
N∞, some memory structures M1,M2, and some b1- and b2-correction functions f1 and f2.
Then, we have G1 ≤bM,f G3, where M = M1 × M2, f = f2 ◦ f1, and b = b1 if b2 ≥ f1(b1)
and b = max{b′ | f1(b′) ≤ b2} otherwise.
Proof. Let Gj = (Aj ,Costj) for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Clearly, we have A3 = A2 × M2 = A1 × M1 × M2
and f2 ◦ f1(Cost1(ρ)) = f2(Cost2(extM1(ρ))) = Cost3(extM2(extM1(ρ))) = Cost3(extM1×M2(ρ)) for
all ρ ∈ V ω. It remains to show that f2 ◦ f1 is a b-correction function, for the b as stated in the theorem.
First, assume b2 ≥ f1(b1) and pick x and x
′ such that x < x′ < b1. As f1 is a b1-correction function,
we obtain f1(x) < f1(x
′), f1(x) < f1(b1), and f1(x
′) < f1(b1). Since f2 is a b2-correction function and
as f1(b1) ≤ b2 by assumption, we furthermore obtain f2(f1(b)) < f2(f1(x′)). Now pick some x such
that x < b1. Then f1(x) < f1(b1) and f2(f1(b1)) ≤ f2(b2). Thus, f2(f1(b)) < f2(f1(b1)). Finally, pick
some x such that x ≥ b1. Then f1(x) ≥ f1(b1). If f1(x) < b2, then f2(f1(x)) ≥ f2(f1(b1)). If, however,
f1(x) ≥ b2, then f2(f1(x)) ≥ f2(b2) ≥ f2(f1(b1)), which concludes this part of the proof.
Now assume b2 < f1(b1) and let b
′ be maximal such that f1(b
′) < b2. We show that f2 ◦ f1 is
a b′-correction function. First, pick x and x′ such that x < x′ < b′. Then f1(x) < f1(x
′) < b2, i.e.,
f2(f1(x)) < f2(f1(x
′)). Now, pick x such that x < b′. Then we have f1(x) < f1(b
′) < b2, which
implies f2(f1(x)) < f2(f1(b
′)). Finally, pick x such that x ≥ b′. If f1(x) < b2, then f1(x) ≥ f1(b′)
and f2(f1(x)) ≥ f2(f1(b′)). If, however, f1(x) ≥ b2, then f1(x) > f1(b′) and, as f1(b′) < b2, we moreover
obtain f2(f1(x)) ≥ f2(f1(b′)).
Quantitative reductions indeed retain the costs of strategies. To this end, we first demonstrate that
correction functions tie the cost of plays in G′ to that of plays in G.
Lemma 1. Let G and G′ be quantitative games such that G ≤bM,f G
′, for some b ∈ N∞, some memory
structure M, and some b-correction function f . All of the following hold true for all b′ ∈ N and all
plays ρ in G:
1. If b′ < b and Cost′(ext(ρ)) < f(b′), then Cost(ρ) < b′.
2. If b′ < b and Cost′(ext(ρ)) = f(b′), then Cost(ρ) = b′.
3. If Cost′(ext(ρ)) ≥ f(b), then Cost(ρ) ≥ b.
Proof. 1) Let b′ < b and let ρ such that Cost′(ext(ρ)) < f(b′). Towards a contradiction assume
Cost(ρ) = b′′ ≥ b′. We have f(b′′) = f(Cost(ρ)) = Cost′(ext(ρ)). If b′′ < b, then we obtain f(b′) ≤ f(b′′),
which implies f(b′) ≤ Cost′(ext(ρ)), contradicting Cost′(ext(ρ)) < f(b′). If, however, b′′ ≥ b, then
Cost′(ext(ρ)) = f(b′′) ≥ f(b) > f(b′), again contradicting Cost′(ext(ρ)) < f(b′).
2) Let b′ < b and let ρ such that Cost′(ext(ρ)) = f(b′). Towards a contradiction assume Cost(ρ) =
b′′ 6= b′. We again have f(b′′) = Cost′(ext(ρ)). First assume b′′ < b′. Then we have b′′ < b′ < b, which
implies f(b′′) < f(b′), contradicting Cost′(ext(ρ)) = f(b′). If b′ < b′′ < b, we obtain the contradiction
Cost′(ext(ρ)) > f(b′) analogously. Finally, if b ≤ b′′, then Cost′(ext(ρ)) = f(b′′) ≥ f(b) > f(b′), which
again contradicts Cost′(ext(ρ)) = f(b′).
3) Let ρ such that Cost′(ext(ρ)) ≥ f(b). Towards a contradiction assume Cost(ρ) = b′ < b. We again
have f(b′) = Cost′(ext(ρ)). However, we obtain f(b′) < f(b) due to f being a b-correction function. This
contradicts Cost′(ext(ρ)) = f(b′) ≥ f(b).
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These properties of correction functions when used in quantitative reductions enable us to state
and prove the main result of this section, which establishes quantitative reductions as the quantitative
counterpart to qualitative reductions: If G ≤b+1M,f G
′, then all plays of cost at most b in G are “tracked”
precisely in G′. Hence, as long as the cost of a strategy in G is at most b, it is possible to construct a
strategy in G′ with cost at most f(b). This holds true for both players.
If a strategy has cost greater than b, however, we do not have a direct correspondence between costs
of plays in G and G′ anymore. If, however, b additionally is a cap of G, and if G is determined, then
we can still show that Player 1 has a strategy of infinite cost in G if he has a strategy of cost greater
than f(b) in G′.
Theorem 2. Let G and G′ be determined quantitative games such that G ≤b+1M,f G
′ for some b,M, and f ,
where b ∈ N is a cap of G.
1. Let b′ < b + 1. Player i has a strategy σ′ in G′ with Cost′(σ′) = f(b′) if and only if they have a
strategy σ in G with Cost(σ) = b′.
2. If Player 1 has a strategy τ ′ in G′ with Cost′(τ ′) ≥ f(b + 1), then he has a strategy τ in G
with Cost(τ) =∞.
Proof. 1) Let σ′ be a strategy for Player i in G′ with Cost′(σ′) = f(b′) for some b′ ≤ b. For all play
prefixes pi ending in a vertex in Vi in G, we define the strategy σ for Player i in G via σ(pi) = v, if
σ′(ext(pi)) = (v,m). Let an infinite play ρ be consistent with σ. A straightforward induction shows that
ρ′ = ext(ρ) is consistent with σ′. If i = 0, then Cost′(ρ′) = Cost′(ext(ρ)) ≤ f(b′) and thus, Cost(ρ) ≤ b′,
due to Lemma 1.1 and Lemma 1.2, as b′ < b + 1. This in turn implies Cost(σ) ≤ b′. If i = 1, we
obtain Cost(ρ) ≥ b′ using similar reasoning.
Since b′ < b + 1 < ∞, we obtain f(b′) < ∞: If f(b′) = ∞, we have f(b′ + 1) = ∞, which con-
tradicts strict monotonicity of f up to and including b + 1. Let ρ′ be a play consistent with σ′ such
that Cost′(ρ′) = f(b′). Since Cost′(σ′) = f(b′) < ∞, such a play exists. Moreover, let ρ be the unique
play such that ext(ρ) = ρ′. By induction, we obtain that ρ is consistent with σ. Additionally, we have
Cost(ρ) = b′ due to Cost′(ρ′) = Cost′(ext(ρ)) = f(b′) and Lemma 1.2. Hence, Cost(σ) ≥ b′ if i = 0, and
Cost(σ) ≤ b′ if i = 1.
Now let σ be a strategy for Player i in G with Cost(σ) = b′ < b + 1. For all play prefixes ext(pi) =
(v0,m0) · · · (vj ,mj) ending in a vertex in Vi × M in G′, we define the strategy σ′ as σ′(ext(pi)) =
(v,Upd(mj , v)) if σ(pi) = v. We claim Cost
′(σ′) = f(b′).
Let ext(ρ) be a play consistent with σ′. A straightforward induction yields that ρ is consistent with σ,
hence, if i = 0, then Cost(ρ) ≤ b′ and Cost′(ext(ρ)) ≤ f(b′) due to b′ < b + 1. Hence, Cost′(σ′) ≤ f(b′).
Dually, if i = 1, then Cost(ρ) ≥ b′ and Cost′(ext(ρ)) ≥ f(b′), consequently Cost′(σ′) ≥ f(b′). Now
let ρ be a play consistent with σ such that Cost(ρ) = b′. Since b′ < ∞, such a play exists. Via another
straightforward induction we obtain that ext(ρ) is consistent with σ′. As Cost′(ext(ρ)) = f(b′), we
obtain Cost′(σ′) ≥ f(b′) for i = 0 and Cost′(σ′) ≤ f(b′) for i = 1.
2) Let τ ′ be a strategy for Player 1 in G′ with Cost′(τ ′) ≥ f(b + 1). We define the strategy τ for
Player 1 in G via τ(pi) = v if τ ′(ext(pi)) = (v,m) for all play prefixes pi in G. Let ρ′ be a play consistent
with τ ′ such that Cost′(ρ′) ≥ f(b + 1) and let ρ be the unique play in G such that ext(ρ) = ρ′. A
straightforward induction yields that ρ is consistent with τ . Then, we obtain Cost(ρ) ≥ b + 1 due to
Lemma 1.3. Thus, we furthermore obtain Cost(τ) ≥ b+ 1. Since b is a cap of G and due to determinacy
of G, this implies that there exists a strategy τ ′′ for Player 1 in G such that Cost(τ ′′) =∞.
We proved Theorem 2 by constructing optimal strategies for Player 0 in G from optimal strategies
for her in G′. These strategies use the set of all play prefixes of G′ as memory states and may thus be of
infinite size. If Player 0 can achieve a certain cost in G′ using a finite-state strategy, however, then she
can achieve the corresponding cost in G with a finite-state strategy as well.
Theorem 3. Let G and G′ be quantitative games such that G ≤bM1,f G
′ for some b, M1, and f and
let b′ < b. If Player i has a finite-state strategy σ′ with Cost′(σ′) = f(b′) in G′ that is implemented
by M2, then she has a finite-state strategy σ with Cost(σ) = b′ in G that is implemented by M1 ×M2.
Proof. Let G = (A,Cost), G′ = (A′,Cost′), M1 = (M1,m1I ,Upd1), and M2 = (M2,m
2
I ,Upd2) such
that σ′ is implemented by M2 with the next-move function Nxt
′ : (V ×M1) ×M2 → (V ×M1). We
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define Nxt(v, (m1,m2)) = v
∗ if Nxt′((v,m1),m2) = (v
∗,Upd(m1, v
∗)). Let σ be the strategy implemented
by M1 ×M2 with the next-move function Nxt.
Let ρ = v0v1v2 · · · be an arbitrary play consistent with σ. Furthermore, let the play extM1×M2(ρ) =
(v0,m
0
1,m
0
2)(v1,m
1
1,m
1
2)(v2,m
2
1,m
2
2) · · · be its extension with respect to M1 ×M2, and let j ∈ N such
that vj ∈ V0. Then, vj+1 = σ(v0 · · · vj) = Nxt(vj , (m1j ,m
2
j)). Due to the definition of Nxt, this implies
Nxt′((vj ,m
1
j),m
2
j ) = (vj+1,m
1
j+1), where m
1
j+1 = Upd1(m
1
j , vj+1) due to the construction of A ×M1.
Hence, extM1(ρ) is consistent with σ
′, i.e., Cost′(extM1(ρ)) ≤ f(b
′), which in turn implies Cost(ρ) ≤ b′
for i = 0 due to Lemma 1.1 and Lemma 1.2, and Cost′(extM1(ρ)) ≥ f(b
′) and Cost(ρ) ≥ b′ for i = 1.
Note that, due to similar reasoning, for each play extM1(ρ) consistent with σ
′ the play ρ is consistent
with σ. If i = 1 or b′ <∞, this concludes the proof. If, however, i = 0 and b′ =∞, then we furthermore
obtain that b =∞ and that f is a strictly monotonic function with f(∞) =∞. Hence, if there exists a
play extM1(ρ) consistent with σ
′ with Cost′(extM1(ρ)) = ∞, then Cost(ρ) = ∞ and, hence, Cost(σ) =
∞. If, however, the costs of the plays consistent with σ′ diverges, then the cost of the plays consistent
with σ diverges as well and we obtain Cost(σ) =∞.
Using quantitative reductions we are able to structure the space of quantitative games similarly to that
of qualitative games. Quantitative games are, however, usually solved by reducing them to qualitative
games for a fixed bound b. Thus, there exists no “foundation” of the space of quantitative winning
conditions, i.e., there is no canonical simple class of quantitative games that provides a natural target
for quantitative reductions. We provide such a foundation in the form of vertex-ranked games in the
following section.
4 Vertex-Ranked Games
We introduce a very simple form of quantitative games, which we call vertex-ranked games. In such games,
the cost of a play is determined solely by a qualitative winning condition and a ranking of the vertices of
the arena by natural numbers. We show that both winning conditions only incur a polynomial overhead
in the complexity of solving them with respect to the underlying winning conditions. Furthermore,
we show that the memory structures implementing winning strategies for either player only incur a
polynomial overhead in comparison to the memory structures implementing winning strategies for the
underlying conditions. Moreover, we discuss the optimization problem for such games, i.e., the problem
of determining the minimal b such that Player 0 has a strategy of cost at most b in such a game.
LetA be an arena with vertex set V , let Win ⊆ V ω be a qualitative winning condition, and let rk : V →
N be a ranking function on vertices. We define the quantitative vertex-ranked sup-condition
Ranksup(Win, rk) : v0v1v2 · · · 7→
{
supj→∞ rk(vj) if v0v1v2 · · · ∈Win ,
∞ otherwise ,
as well as its prefix-independent version, the vertex-ranked lim sup-condition
Ranklim(Win, rk) : v0v1v2 · · · 7→
{
lim supj→∞ rk(vj) if v0v1v2 · · · ∈Win ,
∞ otherwise .
A vertex-ranked sup- or lim sup-game G = (A,RankX(Win, rk)) with X ∈ {sup, lim} consists of an
arenaA with vertex set V , a qualitative winning conditionWin, and a vertex-ranking function rk: V → N.
If GX = (A,Rank
X(Win, rk)) is a vertex-ranked sup- or lim sup-game, we call the game (A,Win)
the qualitative game corresponding to GX . Moreover, if Gsup is a vertex-ranked sup-game, we denote the
vertex-ranked lim sup-game with the same arena, winning condition, and rank function by Glim and vice
versa. In either case, we denote the corresponding qualitative game by G.
The remainder of this section is dedicated to providing tight bounds on the complexity of solving
vertex-ranked games with respect to some given bound. In particular, we show that vertex-ranked sup-
games can be solved with only an additive linear blowup compared to the complexity of solving the
corresponding qualitative games. Vertex-ranked lim sup-games, on the other hand, can be solved while
incurring only a polynomial blowup compared to solving the corresponding qualitative games.
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4.1 Solving Vertex-Ranked sup-Games
Let us start by noting that solving vertex-ranked sup-games is at least as hard as solving the underlying
qualitative games. This is due to the fact that Player 0 has a winning strategy in (A,Win) if and only
if she has a strategy with cost at most zero in (A,Ranksup(Win, rk)), where rk is the constant function
assigning zero to every vertex.
We now turn our attention to finding an upper bound for the complexity of solving vertex-ranked sup-
games with respect to some bound. To achieve a general treatment of such games, we first introduce some
notation. Let G be a class of qualitative games. We define the extension of G to vertex-ranked sup-games
as
G
rnk
sup = {(A,Rank
sup(Win, rk)) | (A,Win) ∈ G, rk is vertex-ranking function for A} .
We first show that we can use a decision procedure solving games from G to solve games from Grnksup
with respect to a given b. To this end, we remove all vertices from which Player 1 can enforce a visit to
a vertex of rank greater than b and proclaim that Player 0 wins the quantitative game with respect to b
if and only if she wins the qualitative game corresponding to the resulting quantitative game. To ensure
that we are able to solve the resulting qualitative game, we assume some closure properties of G.
Let A = (V, V0, V1, E, vI) and A′ = (V ′, V ′0 , V
′
1 , E
′, v′I) be arenas. We say that A
′ is a sub-arena of A
if V ′ ⊆ V , V ′0 ⊆ V0, V
′
1 ⊆ V1, and E
′ ⊆ E and write A′ ⊑ A in this case. We call a class of qualitative
(or quantitative) games G proper if for each (A,Win) (or (A,Cost)) in G and each sub-arena A′ ⊑ A
the game (A′,Win′) (or (A′,Cost′)), where Win′ (or Cost′) is the restriction of Win (or Cost) to vertices
from A′, is a member of G as well, if all games in G are determined and if all G ∈ G are finitely
representable.
Moreover, in order to formalize the idea of removing vertices from which one player can enforce a
visit to some set of vertices, we recall the attractor construction. Let A = (V, V0, V1, E, vI) be an arena
with n vertices and let X ⊆ V . We define Attri(X) = Attr
n
i (X) inductively with Attr
0
i (X) = X and
Attrji (X) = {v ∈ Vi | ∃v
′ ∈ Attrj−1i (X). (v, v
′) ∈ E}∪
{v ∈ V1−i | ∀(v, v
′) ∈ E. v′ ∈ Attrj−1i (X)} ∪ Attr
j−1
i (X) .
Intuitively, the i-attractor Attri(X) is the set of all vertices from which Player i can enforce a visit to X .
The set Attri(X) can be computed in linear time in |E| and Player i has a positional strategy σ such
that each play starting in some vertex in Attri(X) and consistent with σ eventually encounters some
vertex from X [24]. We call σ the attractor strategy towards X .
Player 0 wins Gsup ∈ Grnksup with respect to some bound b if and only if the initial vertex of Gsup is
not in the 1-attractor A of the vertices of rank greater than b, and if she is able to win the game G′
obtained from G by removing the 1-attractor of A. Since A is computable in linear time, we obtain a
generic decision procedure solving vertex-ranked sup-games in linear time and space.
Theorem 4. Let G be a proper class of qualitative games G that can be solved in time t(|G|) and
space s(|G|), where t and s are monotonic functions.
Then, the following problem can be solved in time O(n)+ t(|G|) and space O(n)+s(|G|): “Given some
game Gsup ∈ Grnksup with n vertices and some bound b ∈ N, does Player 0 win Gsup with respect to b?”
In order to prove Theorem 4, we first formalize the notion of removing attractors from arenas:
Let A be an arena with vertex set V , let X ⊆ V , and let A = Attri(X). If vI /∈ A, then we define
A \A = (V \A, V0 \A, V1 \A,E \ (A×A), vI). Note that A \A is again an arena. We lift this notation
to qualitative (quantitative) games G = (A,Win) (or (A,Cost)) by defining G \ A = (A \ A,Win) (or
(A \ A,Cost)). If vI ∈ A, however, then both A \ A and G \ A are undefined. The game G \ A can be
constructed in linear time and is of size at most |G|.
We first show that vertex-ranked sup-games can be solved by using a single attractor construction
and considering the qualitative game obtained by removing the resulting attractor.
Lemma 2. Let G be a proper class of qualitative games, let Gsup = (A,Rank
sup(Win, rk)) ∈ Grnksup with
vertex set V , initial vertex vI , and ranking function rk and let b ∈ N.
Player 0 has a strategy with cost at most b in Gsup if and only if vI /∈ A and if she has a winning
strategy in the qualitative game (A,Win) \A, where A = Attr1({v ∈ V | rk(v) > b}).
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Proof. Let Xb = {v ∈ V | rk(v) > b}. We first show that, if vI /∈ A and if Player 0 wins G′ = G \A, say
with strategy σ′, then she has a strategy of cost at most b in Gsup. Since A′ ⊑ A, the strategy σ′ is a
strategy for Player 0 in Gsup as well, due to Player 0 being able to keep the play inside A′ using σ′ and
each play consistent with σ′ in G′ is consistent with σ′ in G as well as vice versa. Let ρ be a play in Gsup
consistent with σ′. Since σ′ is winning for Player 0 in G′, we have ρ ∈ Win. Moreover, since Xb ⊆ A,
and as ρ visits only vertices occurring in G′, we obtain Ranksup(Win, rk)(ρ) ≤ b and thus Cost(σ′) ≤ b,
which concludes this direction of the proof.
For the other direction, first assume vI ∈ A, let τA be the attractor strategy towards Xb for Player 1.
We obtain Cost(τA) > b in Gsup: By playing consistently with τA, Player 1 forces the play to eventually
reach a vertex in Xb, i.e., a vertex v with rk(v) > b. Thus, Cost(τA) > b, i.e., Cost(σ) > b for all
strategies σ of Player 0.
Finally, assume vI /∈ A and that Player 0 does not have a winning strategy in G′. Towards a contra-
diction, additionally assume that she has a strategy σ with cost at most b in Gsup. Note that no play
consistent with σ visits any vertex from A. Otherwise, playing consistently with his attractor strategy
towards Xb from the first visit to A, Player 1 could construct a play consistent with σ, but with cost
greater than b. Thus, σ is a strategy for Player 0 in G′ and we obtain that all plays consistent with σ
in A are consistent with σ in A′ and vice versa. Since Cost(σ) ≤ b, we obtain Ranksup(Win, rk)(ρ) <∞,
i.e., ρ ∈Win for all plays ρ consistent with σ, a contradiction.
Using this lemma, we are able to construct a decision procedure solving games from Grnksup using a
decision procedure solving games from G.
Proof (Theorem 4). First note that, sinceG is proper,Grnksup is proper as well. Given the vertex-ranked sup-
game Gsup = (A,Rank
sup(Win, rk)), let Xb = {v ∈ V | rk(v) > b} and let A = Attr1(Xb). We define the
decision procedure decsup deciding the given problem such that it returns false if vI ∈ A. Otherwise, decsup
returns true if and only if Player 0 wins G \ A. The procedure decsup indeed decides the given decision
problem due to Lemma 2.
Since we can compute and remove the Player-1-attractorA in linear time in |A| = n [24], the decision
procedure decsup indeed requires time O(n) + t(|G|) and space O(n) + s(|G|).
Theorem 4 provides an upper bound on the complexity of solving vertex-ranked sup-games. Intuitively,
we prove Theorem 4 by showing that, for any vertex-ranked sup-game Gsup, a winning strategy for
Player 0 in G that never moves to the Player 1-attractor towards vertices of rank greater than b has
cost at most b. Thus, an upper bound on the size of winning strategies for Player 0 for games from G
provides an upper bound for strategies of finite cost in Grnksup as well. Moreover, if the decision procedure
deciding G constructs winning strategies for one or both players, we can adapt the decision procedure
deciding Grnksup to construct strategies of cost at most (greater than) b for Player 0 (Player 1) as well.
Corollary 1. Let G be a proper class of qualitative games and let G ∈ G. If σ is a finite-state winning
strategy for Player i in G, then Player i has a finite-state winning strategy σsup in Gsup with |σsup| ∈
O(|σ|). Furthermore, if σ is effectively constructible, then σsup is effectively constructible.
Finally, this procedure enables us to solve the optimization problem for vertex-ranked sup-games
from Grnksup : Recall that if Player 0 wins Gsup with respect to some b, she wins it with respect to all b
′ ≥ b
as well. Hence, using a binary search, log(n) invocations of the decision procedure obtained in the proof
of Theorem 4 suffice to determine the minimal b such that Player 0 wins Gsup with respect to b. Hence,
it is possible to determine the minimal such b in time O(log(n)(n+ t(|G|))) and space O(n) + s(|G|).
4.2 Solving Vertex-Ranked lim sup-Games
We now turn our attention to solving vertex-ranked lim sup-games. Solving these games is again at least
as hard as solving their corresponding qualitative games, due to the same reasoning as given above
for vertex-ranked sup-games. Thus, we again only provide upper bounds on the complexity of solving
such games. To this end, given some class G of games, we define the corresponding class of vertex-
ranked lim sup-games
G
rnk
lim = {(A,Rank
lim(Win, rk)) | (A,Win) ∈ G, rk is vertex-ranking function for A} .
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We identify two criteria on classes of qualitative games G, each of which is sufficient for quantitative
games in Grnklim to be solvable with respect to some given b. More precisely, we provide decision procedures
for Grnklim for the case that
1. games from G can be solved in conjunction with coBu¨chi-conditions, and for the case that
2. games from G are prefix-independent.
For the first case, fix some class of games G and let Glim = (A,Rank
lim(Win, rk)) ∈ Grnklim with
vertex set V . Moreover, recall that a play in Win has cost at most b in Glim if it visits vertices of
rank greater than b only finitely often. In general, such behavior is formalized by the qualitative co-
Bu¨chi condition CoBu¨chi(F ) = {ρ ∈ V ω | inf(ρ) ∩ F = ∅}, where inf(ρ) denotes the set of vertices
occurring infinitely often in ρ. Clearly, Player 0 has a strategy of cost at most b in Glim if and only if she
wins (A,Win ∩CoBu¨chi({v ∈ V | rk(v) > b})). This observation gives rise to the following remark.
Remark 1. Let G be a class of qualitative games such that the games in {(A,Win ∩ CoBu¨chi(F )) |
(A,Win) ∈ G, F ⊆ V, V is vertex set of A} can be solved in time t(|G|, |F |) and space s(|G|, |F |), where t
and s are monotonic functions.
Then, the following problem can be solved in time t(|Glim|, n) and space s(|Glim|, n): “Given some
game Glim ∈ Grnklim with n vertices and some bound b ∈ N, does Player 0 win Glim with respect to b?”
In this case, we solve vertex-ranked lim sup-games via a decision procedure for solving qualitative
games as-is. Such a procedure trivially exists if the winning conditions of games from G are closed
under intersection with co-Bu¨chi conditions. Thus, we obtain solvability of a wide range of classes of
vertex-ranked lim sup-games, e.g., co-Bu¨chi-, parity-, Muller-, Streett- and Rabin games.
We now turn our attention to the second case described above: We consider classes Grnklim where a play
is only determined to be winning or losing in a game from G due to some infinite suffix. Formally, we
say that a qualitative winning condition Win ⊆ V ω is prefix-independent if for all infinite plays ρ ∈ V ω
and all play prefixes pi ∈ V ∗, we have ρ ∈ Win if and only if piρ ∈ Win. A qualitative game is prefix-
independent if its winning condition is prefix-independent. A class of games is prefix-independent if every
game in the class is prefix-independent.
Let G be a prefix-independent class of games and let Glim ∈ Grnklim . Moreover, let b ∈ N. In order to
solve Glim with respect to b, we adapt the classic algorithm for solving prefix-independent qualitative
games (cf., e.g., the work by Chatterjee, Henzinger, and Piterman [13]). Thereby, we repeatedly compute
the set of vertices from which Player 0 has a strategy of cost at most b in the corresponding vertex-
ranked sup-game Gsup and remove their attractor from the game similarly to the construction of a
decision procedure for vertex-ranked sup-games in Theorem 4. We claim that Player 0 has a strategy
with cost at most b in Glim if and only if vI was not removed during the above construction.
Theorem 5. Let G be a proper prefix-independent class of qualitative games G that can be solved in
time t(|G|) and space s(|G|), where t and s are monotonic functions.
Then, the following problem can be solved in time O(n3 + n2 · t(|Glim|)) and space O(n + s(|Glim|)):
“Given some game Glim ∈ Grnklim with n vertices and some bound b ∈ N, does Player 0 win Glim with
respect to b?”
To prove Theorem 5 let G be a quantitative game with vertex set V . For each v ∈ V , we write Gv to
denote the game G with its initial vertex replaced by v. All other components, i.e., the structure of the
arena and the cost-function, remain unchanged. We write Wbi (G) to denote the set of all vertices v such
that Player i has a strategy of cost at most b, if i = 0, or greater than b, if i = 1, in Gv.
Again, we first show that, if Player 0 does not win a sup-game from any vertex, then she also does
not win the corresponding lim sup-game from any vertex.
Lemma 3. Let Glim = (A,Rank
lim(Win, rk)) be some vertex-ranked lim sup-game such that Win is
prefix-independent and such that Gsup is determined. If Wb0(Gsup) = ∅, then W
b
0(Glim) = ∅.
Proof. Let V be the vertex set of Gsup and Glim. Since Wb0(Gsup) = ∅ and since Gsup is determined, we
obtain Wb1(Gsup) = V . For each v ∈ V , let τ
′
v be a strategy for Player 1 in (Gsup)v with cost greater than b.
We now define a single strategy τ for Player 1 in Glim with cost greater than b. For each pi = v0 · · · vj ∈ V ∗
we define τ(pi) = τ ′vk(vk · · · vj), where k = max{k
′ | rk(vk′−1) > b}, with max ∅ = 0. We claim that τ
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has cost greater than b in all (Glim)v. Since the cost-function Cost is identical in all (Glim)v this claim is
formalized as Cost(τ) > b.
Let ρ = v0v1v2 · · · be a play of Gv consistent with τ . If there are infinitely many positions j
with rk(vj) > b, then Cost(ρ) > b. Thus, assume the opposite and let j be the maximal position
with rk(vj) > b. Then the suffix ρ
′ = vj+1vj+2vj+3 · · · of ρ is consistent with τ
′
vj+1
. Since ρ′ does not
encounter any vertices of rank greater than b, while Cost(ρ′) > b due to ρ′ being consistent with a
strategy of cost greater than b, we obtain ρ′ /∈ Win. This implies ρ /∈ Win due to prefix-independence
of Win. Hence, Cost(ρ) =∞, which, together with the statement above, implies Cost(τ) > b.
We formalize the construction described above:
Proof (Theorem 5). Given Glim = (A,Rank
lim(Win, rk)) with vertex set V of size n, we define G0 = Gsup,
as well as Xj = W
b
0(Gj), Aj = Attr0(Xj), which is computed in the arena of Gj , and Gj+1 = Gj \ Aj
for all j ∈ N. As we only remove vertices from the Gj , we obtain Gj+1 ⊑ Gj . Thus, the series of games
stabilizes at j = n at the latest, i.e., Gj = Gn for all j ≥ n. We define A =
⋃
j≤n Aj and G
′ = Gn and
claim that Player 0 has a strategy with cost at most b in G if and only if vI ∈ A. We first argue that this
suffices to show the desired result.
Let decsup be the decision procedure deciding whether or not Player 0 has a strategy with cost at
most b in games from Grnksup , as constructed in the proof of Theorem 4. The decision procedure decsup can
be easily modified to return W b0 (Gj) instead of a yes/no-answer by applying it to each (Gj)v individually.
This modified procedure dec′sup runs in time at mostO(n
2+n·t(|G|)) and spaceO(n)+s(|G|), where t(|G|)
and s(|G|) are the time and space required to solve G, respectively.
For j ∈ {0, . . . , n}, the decision procedure declim first computes Gj in linear time in n and reusing
the space used for solving Gj−1. It then computes Xj requiring a single call to the modified decsup. It
subsequently computes Aj in time O(n) and space O(n). Finally, it returns false if and only if vI is
in the arena of Gn. In total, we obtain a runtime of declim of O(n3 + n2 · t(|G|)). The only additional
memory required by declim is that for storing the sets Xj and Aj , the size of which is bounded from
above by n. The games Gj can be stored by reusing the memory occupied by G, due to Gj ⊑ Gj−1. Hence,
the procedure declim requires space O(n) + s(|G|).
It remains to show that Player 0 has a strategy with cost at most b in G if and only if vI /∈ An, i.e.,
if vI ∈ A. To this end, first assume vI ∈ A and note that we have Aj ⊇ Xj . However, for each two j 6= j′,
we have Aj ∩ Aj′ = ∅ and, in particular, Xj ∩ Xj′ = ∅. Hence, for each v ∈ A there exists a unique j
such that v ∈ Aj .
We define the strategy σ for Player 0 in G inductively such that any play consistent with σ only
descends through the Xj . Formally, we construct σ such that it satisfies the following invariant:
Let ρ = v0v1v2 · · · be a play consistent with σ and let k ∈ N. If vk ∈ Aj \ Xj , then vk+1 ∈⋃
j′≤j Aj′ ∪Xj′ . Moreover, if vk ∈ (Aj \Xj) ∩ V0, then the move to vk+1 is the move prescribed
by the attractor strategy of Player 0 towards Xj. If vk ∈ Xj, then vk+1 ∈ Xj ∪
⋃
j′<j Aj′ ∪Xj′ .
Clearly, this invariant holds true for pi = vI . Thus, let pi = v0 · · · vk be a play prefix consistent with σ.
If vk ∈ V1, let v∗ be an arbitrary successor of vk in G and assume towards a contradiction that piv∗ violates
the invariant. If vk ∈ Aj \Xj , then in Gj there exists an edge from vk leading to some vertex v∗ /∈ Aj , a
contradiction to the definition of the attractor. If, however, vk ∈ Xj and v
∗ /∈ Xj ∪
⋃
j′<j Aj′ ∪Xj′ , then
Player 1 has a strategy τ in (Gj)v∗ with cost greater than b. Thus, a play that begins in vk, moves to v∗
and is consistent with τ afterwards has cost greater b, i.e., Player 0 does not have a strategy with cost
at most b in (Gj)vk , a contradiction to vk ∈ Xj = W
b
0(Gj). Hence, piv
∗ satisfies the invariant for each
successor v∗ of vk ∈ V1.
Now assume vk ∈ V0 and first let v0 ∈ Aj ∪ Xj for some j ∈ N. Let σAj be the attractor strategy
for Player 0 towards Xj. If vk ∈ Aj \ Xj , we define σ(pi) = σAj (vk), which satisfies the invariant due
to the definition of the attractor strategy. If, however, vk ∈ Xj , let k′ be minimal such that vk′′ ∈ Xj
for all k′′ with k′ ≤ k′′ ≤ k. Moreover, let σvj be a strategy for Player 0 such that every play consistent
with σvj in Gj with initial vertex v has cost at most b. Such a strategy exists due to Xj = W
b
0(Gj). We
define σ(pi) = σ
vk′
j (vk′ · · · vk), which satisfies the invariant to similar reasoning as above.
In order to show Cost(σ) ≤ b, let ρ = v0v1v2 · · · be a play consistent with σ. Due to the invariant
of σ and since v0 ∈ A, the play ρ descends through the Aj and the Xj, i.e., once it encounters some Xj ,
it never moves to any Aj′ \Xj′ with j′ ≥ j nor to any Xj′ with j′ > j. Also, ρ stabilizes in some Xj , i.e.,
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there exists a k ∈ N such that vk′ ∈ Xj for all k′ ≥ k, as σ prescribes moves according to the attractor
strategy towards Xj when in Aj \Xj. Moreover, due to the definition of σ, the suffix ρ′ = vkvk+1vk+2 · · ·
is consistent with σvkj , i.e., we obtain ρ
′ ∈ Win and that the maximal vertex-rank encountered in ρ
is at most b. As Win is prefix-independent, we obtain ρ ∈ Win as well as lim supk→∞ rk(vk) ≤ b.
Hence, Ranklim(Win, rk)(ρ) ≤ b, which concludes this direction of the proof.
Now assume vI /∈ A and consider G′ with vertex set V \A. Since the construction of the Gj stabilized,
we have Aj = Xj = W
b
0 (G
′) = ∅, i.e., Player 1 has a strategy with cost greater than b from any starting
vertex in G′. Due to Lemma 3, this implies that he has such a strategy from every vertex in Gsup \ A,
call it τ . Note that there exists no Player-0-vertex in V \ A that has an outgoing edge leading into A,
as this would contradict the definition of the Player-0-attractors Aj . Hence, τ is a strategy for Player 1
in G as well and we retain Cost(τ) > b.
Intuitively, we prove Theorem 5 by constructing a strategy σ for Player 0 by “stitching together”
the attractor-strategies towards her winning regions in the decreasing vertex-ranked sup-games and the
winning strategies for her in the respective vertex-ranked sup-games. As each play consistent with that
strategy descends down the hierarchy of sup-games thus constructed, we can reuse the memory states of
the winning strategies in these games when implementing σ. Thus, a monotonic upper bound on the size
of strategies with cost at most b in Gsup is an upper bound on the size of such strategies in Glim as well.
Corollary 2. Let G be a proper prefix-independent class of qualitative games such that, if Player 0
wins G, then she has a finite-state winning strategy of size at most m(|G|), where m is a monotonic
function.
If Player 0 wins Glim ∈ Grnklim with finite-state strategies, then she has a finite-state winning strat-
egy σlim of size at most m(|Glim|) in Glim. Furthermore, if winning strategies for Player i in the games
in G are effectively constructible, then σlim is effectively constructible.
Moreover, in order to find the optimal b such that Player 0 wins Glim with respect to b, we can again
employ a binary search. Thus, we can determine the optimal such b in time O(log(n)(n3 + n2 · t(|G|)))
and space O(n+ s(|G|)).
Having thus defined both quantitative reductions as well as a canonical target for such reductions,
we now give an example of how to solve quantitative games using this tools.
5 Applications
In this section, we give examples of how to use quantitative reductions and vertex-ranked games to
solve quantitative games. First, in Section 5.1, we formally introduce a quantitative variant of request-
response games, which we call request-response games with costs, and show how to solve such games
using quantitative reductions and vertex-ranked sup-request-response games. Second, in Section 5.2 we
first recall a quantitative characterization of Muller games due to McNaughton [21], before showing
how to solve such quantitative Muller games using quantitative reductions and vertex-ranked games.
This yields a new and simplified proof of ExpTime-membership of the problem of solving such games.
Subsequently, in Section 5.3, we show that vertex-ranked games are useful in their own right, by showing
how to use them to synthesize controllers that are resilient against disturbances.
5.1 Reducing Request-Response Games with Costs to Vertex-Ranked Request-Response
Games
Recall that a play satisfies the qualitative request-response condition if every request that is opened is
eventually answered. We extend this condition to a quantitative one by equipping the edges of the arena
with costs and measuring the maximal cost incurred between opening and answering a request.
Fix some arena A with vertex set V and set E of edges. Formally, the qualitative request-response
condition ReqRes(Γ ) consists of a family of so-called request-response pairs Γ = (Qc, Pc)c∈[d], where
Qc, Pc ⊆ V for all c ∈ [d]. Player 0 wins a play according to this condition if each visit to some vertex
from Qc is answered by some later visit to a vertex from Pc, i.e., we define
ReqRes((Qc, Pc)c∈[d]) = {v0v1v2 · · · ∈ V
ω | ∀c ∈ [d]∀j ∈ N. vj ∈ Qc implies ∃j
′ ≥ j. vj′ ∈ Pc} .
We say that a visit to a vertex from Qc opens a request for condition c and that the first visit to a vertex
from Pc afterwards answers the request for that condition.
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Proposition 1 ( [27]). Request-response games with n vertices and d request-response pairs can be
solved in time O(n2d22d).
Furthermore, let G be a request-response game with d request response pairs. If Player 0 has a winning
strategy in G, then she has a finite-state winning strategy of size at most d2d.
We extend this winning condition to a quantitative one using families of cost functions Cost =
(Costc)c∈[d], where Costc : E → N for each c ∈ [d] and lift the cost functions Costc to play infixes pi in A
by adding up the costs along pi. The cost-of-response for a request for condition c at position j is then
defined as
ReqResCorc(v0v1v2 · · · , j) =
{
min{Costc(vj · · · vj′ ) | j′ ≥ j and vj′ ∈ Pc} if vj ∈ Qc ,
0 otherwise ,
with min ∅ =∞, which naturally extends to the (total) cost-of-response
ReqResCor(ρ, j) = maxc∈[d]ReqResCorc(ρ, j) .
Finally, we define the request-response condition with costs as
CostReqRes(Γ,Cost)(ρ) = supj→∞ReqResCor(ρ, j) ,
i.e., it measures the maximal cost incurred by any request in ρ.
We call a game G = (A,CostReqRes(Γ,Cost)) a request-response game with costs. We denote the
largest cost assigned to any edge byW . As we assume the functions Costc to be given in binary encoding,
the largest cost W assigned to an edge may be exponential in the description length of G.
If all Costc assign zero to every edge, then the request-response condition with costs coincides with
the qualitative request-response condition. In general, however, the request-response condition with costs
is a strengthening of the classical request-response condition: If some play ρ has finite cost according to
the condition with costs, then it is winning for Player 0 according to the qualitative condition, but not
vice versa.
Remark 2. Let G = (A,CostReqRes(Γ,Cost)) be a request-response game with costs. If a strategy σ
for Player 0 in G has finite cost, then σ is a winning strategy for Player 0 in (A,ReqRes(Γ )).
This remark together with a detour via qualitative request-response games yield a cap for request-
response games with costs.
Lemma 4. Let G be a request-response game with costs with n vertices, d request-response pairs, and
largest cost of an edge W . If Player 0 has a strategy with finite cost in G, then she also has a strategy
with cost at most d2dnW .
Proof. Let G = (A,CostReqRes(Γ,Cost)) and let G′ = (A,ReqRes(Γ )) be a qualitative request-
response game obtained by disregarding the cost functions of G. Moreover, let σ be a strategy with finite
cost for G. Due to Remark 2, σ is winning for Player 0 in G′ as well, i.e., Player 0 wins G′. Thus, due
to Proposition 1, she has a winning strategy σ′ of size at most d2d in G′. Let σ′ be implemented by the
memory structure M and let b = d2dnW . We show Cost(σ′) ≤ b.
Let ρ = v0v1v2 · · · be a play consistent with σ′ and, towards a contradiction, assume that we have
CostReqRes(Γ,Cost)(ρ) > b. Then there exist c ∈ [d] and j ∈ N such that ReqResCorc(ρ, j) > b.
As each edge has cost at most W , the request for condition c opened at position j is not answered
for at least d2dn steps, i.e., we obtain vj′ /∈ Pc for all j
′ with j ≤ j′ ≤ j + d2dn. Let ext(ρ) =
(v0,m0)(v1,m1)(v2,m2) · · · . Since we have |M| ≤ d2d, there exists a vertex repetition on the play
infix (vj ,mj) · · · (vj+d2dn,mj+d2dn) of ext(ρ), say at positions k and k
′ with j ≤ k < k′ ≤ j+d2dn. Then
the play ρ′ = v0 · · · vk(vk+1 · · · vk′)ω is consistent with σ′.
In ρ′, however, a request for condition c is opened at position j ≤ k. Since j ≤ k′ ≤ j + d2dn, this
request is not answered in the play infix vj · · · vk · · · vk′ , i.e., it is never answered. Hence, ρ′ /∈ ReqRes(Γ ),
which contradicts σ′ being a winning strategy for Player 0 in G′.
Having obtained a cap for request-response games with costs, we can now turn to the main result
of this section: Request-response games with costs are reducible to vertex-ranked sup-request-response
games. In order to show this, we use a memory structure that keeps track of the costs incurred by the
requests open at each point in the play [29].
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Lemma 5. Let G be a request-response game with costs with n vertices, d request-response pairs, and
highest cost of an edge W . Then G ≤b+1M G
′ for b = d2dnW , some memory structure M of size O(2nbd),
and a vertex-ranked sup-request-response game G′ with d request-response pairs.
Proof. Let G = (A,CostReqRes(Γ,Cost)) with initial vertex vI . Recall that b = d2dnW , is a cap of G
due to Lemma 4. We first define the memory structure M. Intuitively, we use it to keep track of the
currently open requests and the costs they have incurred up to the cap b. Once the cost of a single request
incurs a cost greater than b, the memory structure raises a Boolean flag, which indicates that Player 1
can unbound the cost of that request.
Let r : [d]→ {⊥}∪ [b+1] = {⊥, 0, . . . , b} be a function mapping conditions c to the cost r(c) ∈ [b+1]
they have incurred so far, or to r(c) = ⊥ if no request for that condition is pending. We call such a
function a request-function and denote the set of all request functions by R. We define the initial request
function rI such that rI(c) = 0 if vI ∈ Qc and rI(c) = ⊥ otherwise. In order to be able to access the
current vertex during the update of the memory structure, we store it in the memory structure as well.
By accessing the current vertex together with the vertex that we move to, we are thus able to obtain the
cost of the traversed edge. Finally, we store a flag that indicates whether or not the bound b has been
exceeded. Hence, we define the set of memory states M = V ×R× {0, 1} with the initial memory state
mI = (vI , rI , 0).
We define the update function Upd((v, r, f), v′) = (v′, r′, f ′) by performing the following steps in
order:
– For each c ∈ [d], if r(c) 6= ⊥, set r′(c) = r(c) + Costc((v, v′)). Otherwise, set r′(c) = ⊥.
– Now, if there exists a condition c such that r′(c) > f , then set r′(c) = ⊥ for all c and set f ′ to 1.
Otherwise, set f ′ to f .
– For each c ∈ [d], if v′ ∈ Qc, set r(c′) to max{r(c′), 0} where ⊥ < 0.
– For each c ∈ [d], if v′ ∈ Pc, set r(c′) to ⊥.
We obtainM = (M,mI ,Upd). Note that |M| ∈ O(2nb
d), i.e.,M is of exponential size in d, but only
of polynomial size in n and W .
Using this definition, we obtain that if CostReqRes(Γ,Cost)(ρ) ≤ b, then ext(ρ) remains in vertices
of the form (v, v, r, 0). Dually, if CostReqRes(Γ,Cost)(ρ) > b, then ext(ρ) eventually moves to vertices
of the form (v, v, r, 1) and remains there ad infinitum.
Let Γ = (Qc, Pc)c∈[d]. It remains to define the vertex-ranking function rk: V ×M → N, as well
as the family of request-response pairs Γ ′ for G′. We define the former as rk(v, v, r, 0) = maxc∈[d] r(c)
and rk(v, v, r, 1) = b + 1 and the latter as Γ ′ = (Q′c, P
′
c)c∈[d], where Q
′
c = Qc × Qc × R × {0, 1} and
P ′c = Pc ×Pc ×R×{0, 1} for all c ∈ [d]. Note that ρ ∈ ReqRes(Γ ) if and only if ext(ρ) ∈ ReqRes(Γ
′).
Moreover, let ρ = v0v1v2 be some play in G and let ext(ρ) = (v0, v0, r0, f0)(v1, v1, r1, f1)(v2, v2, r2, f2) · · ·
be its extension. Note that the current vertex vj is replicated in the memory state in order to be able
to access it in the update of the memory state during the move to vj+1, thereby attaining access to
the traversed edge (vj , vj+1). If CostReqRes(Γ,Cost)(ρ) ≤ b and if, for some c ∈ [d] and some j ∈
N, we have ReqResCorc(ρ, j) = b
′, then rj′ (c) = b
′, where j′ is the earliest position at which the
request for c opened at position j is answered. Dually, if rj′ (c) = b
′ for some j′ ∈ N and some c ∈ [d],
then ReqResCorc(ρ, j) = b
′, where j is the earliest position at which the request for condition c is
opened without being answered prior to position j′.
We define G′ = (A×M,Ranksup(ReqRes(Γ ′), rk)). Moreover, since Γ ′ is the extension of Γ to the
vertices of A×M, G′ contains d many request-response pairs.
It remains to show G ≤b+1M G
′. Recall that the (b + 1)-correction-function ∩b+1 is given implicitly.
Clearly, the first and second condition of the definition of the quantitative reduction hold true, i.e., the
arena of G′ is A×M and capb+1 is a (b+1)-correction function. It remains to show the two latter condi-
tions. To this end, let ρ = v0v1v2 · · · ∈ V ω and let ext(ρ) = (v0, v0, r0, f0)(v1, v1, r1, f1)(v2, v2, r2, f2) · · · .
We use the shorthands CostG = CostReqRes(Γ,Cost) and CostG′ = Rank
sup(ReqRes(Γ ′), rk).
We first show CostG(ρ) = CostG′(ext(ρ)) for all ρ with CostG(ρ) < b + 1. Let CostG(ρ) = b
′ < b + 1
and note that this implies ρ ∈ ReqRes(Γ ) and ext(ρ) ∈ ReqRes(Γ ′). As argued above, we obtain
rk(vj , vj , rj , fj) ≤ b′ for all j, which implies CostG′(ext(ρ)) ≤ b′. Moreover, let c ∈ [d] and j ∈ N such
that ReqResCorc(ρ, j) = b
′. Since b′ <∞, such c and j exist. The play ext(ρ) visits a vertex of rank b′
at the position at which the request for condition c opened at position j is answered for the first time.
Thus, CostG′(ext(ρ)) ≥ b′, which concludes this part of the proof.
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It remains to show CostG′(ext(ρ)) ≥ capb+1(b + 1) = b + 1 for all ρ with CostG(ρ) ≥ b + 1. To
this end, let CostG(ρ) = b
′ ≥ b + 1. As argued above, the extended play ext(ρ) eventually moves to
vertices of the form (v, v, r, 1) and remains there. Hence, CostG′(ext(ρ)) = b + 1 if ρ ∈ ReqRes(Γ ),
i.e., if ext(ρ) ∈ ReqRes(Γ ′). If, however, ρ /∈ ReqRes(Γ ), then ext(ρ) /∈ ReqRes(Γ ′) and hence,
CostG′(ρ) =∞ > b+ 1.
Thus, in order to solve a request-response game with costs with respect to some b, it suffices to solve
a vertex-ranked sup-request-response game with respect to b. This, in turn, can be done by reducing
the problem to that of solving a request-response game as shown in Theorem 4. Using this reduction
together with the framework of quality-preserving reductions, we are able to provide an upper bound on
the complexity of solving request-response games with respect to some bound b.
Theorem 6. The following decision problem is in ExpTime: “Given some request-response game with
costs G and some bound b ∈ N, does Player 0 have a strategy σ with Cost(σ) ≤ b in G?”
Proof. Let G contain n vertices, d request-response pairs, and let W be the largest cost assigned to
any edge. We first construct the vertex-ranked sup-request-response game G′ as shown in Lemma 5.
Recall that G′ contains O(n(d2dnW )d) vertices and d request-response pairs. Due to the instantiation
of Theorem 4 with the decision procedure for qualitative request-response games from Proposition 1,
the game G′ can be solved with respect to b in time O(n3(d2dnW )3dd22d), which is exponential in the
description length of G, due to W 3d ∈ O((2|G|)|G|) = O(2|G|
2
).
Moreover, solving request-response games is known to be ExpTime-hard [12]. Thus, solving quanti-
tative request-response games via quantitative reductions is asymptotically optimal.
Also, recall that Player 0 has a strategy with cost b′ in some request-response game with costs if and
only if she has a strategy with cost b′ in the vertex-ranked sup-request-response game G′ constructed in
the proof of Lemma 5, which has as many request-response pairs d as G. Due to Proposition 1, if she has
a strategy of cost at most b′ in G′, she has one of the same cost and of size at most d2d in G′, as argued
in Section 4.1. Hence, due to Theorem 3, we obtain an exponential upper bound on the size of optimal
strategies for Player 0.
Corollary 3. Let G be a request-response game with costs with n vertices, d request-response pairs, and
highest cost of an edge W . If Player 0 has a strategy with finite cost, then she also has a strategy with
the same cost of size at most O(nbdd2d), where b = d2dnW .
Finally, the optimization problem of finding the minimal b′ such that Player 0 wins a request-response
game G with respect to b′ can be solved in exponential time as well. Recall that if Player 0 wins G with
respect to some b′, then she also wins it with respect to all b′′ ≥ b′. Since we can assume b′ ≤ b = d2dnW ,
we can perform a binary search for b′ on the interval {0, . . . , b}. Hence, the optimal b′ can be found in
time O(log(b)n3b3dd2d).
5.2 Reducing Quantitative Muller Games to Vertex-Ranked Safety Games
Having shown how our framework can be used to find optimal strategies in request-response games with
costs in a structured and modular way, we now show how it can be used to greatly simplify such existing
proofs. To this end, we show how to reduce quantitative Muller games to vertex-ranked safety games [22].
Let A be some arena with vertex set V and recall the qualitative Muller condition, which is defined
by a partition of 2V into (F0,F1) as Muller(F0,F1) = {ρ ∈ V
ω | inf(ρ) ∈ F0}, where inf(ρ) denotes
the set of vertices that are visited infinitely often by ρ. Thus, Player i wins ρ if and only if inf(ρ) ∈ Fi.
McNaughton introduced a quantitative characterization of the Muller condition by assigning a score
to each prefix of a play and each subset of the set of vertices [21]. In order to characterize the infinity-set
of a play, the score of a subset F measures how often F has been visited completely without leaving it.
For a play ρ, the limit inferior of the score of inf(ρ) tends towards infinity, while the limit inferior of the
score for all other sets is zero [21].
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Formally, for any set F ⊆ V with F 6= ∅, the score ScoreF (pi) is defined inductively using an
accumulator that stores the vertices of F that have already been visited, as follows:
(AccF (ε), ScoreF (ε)) = (∅, 0)
(AccF (piv), ScoreF (piv)) =


(∅, 0) if v /∈ F
(∅, ScoreF (pi) + 1) if AccF (pi) = F \ {v}
(AccF (pi) ∪ {v}, ScoreF (pi)) otherwise
We lift the score-function to families F of subsets of vertices, i.e., F ⊆ 2V , by defining ScoreF (pi) =
maxF∈F(ScoreF (pi)) and to infinite plays via ScoreF (v0v1v2 · · · ) = supj→∞ ScoreF1(v0 · · · vj). Due to this
definition, we obtain the quantitative Muller condition, which is defined viaQuantMuller(F0,F1)(ρ) =
ScoreF1(ρ). We obtain a cap for such games using a result by Fearnley and Zimmermann [17].
Lemma 6. Let G = (A,Cost) be a quantitative Muller game. If Player 0 has a strategy with finite cost
in G, then she has a strategy σ with Cost(σ) ≤ 2.
Proof. Let G = (A,QuantMuller(F0,F1)). Since Cost(σ) <∞, for every play ρ consistent with σ and
every prefix pi of ρ, we have that there exists an upper bound on ScoreF (pi) for all F ∈ F1. Moreover,
as the score of inf(ρ) tends towards ∞, this implies inf(ρ) ∈ F0, i.e., σ is a winning strategy for the
qualitative Muller game G′ = (A,Muller(F0,F1)).
It is known that, since Player 0 wins G′, she has a strategy σ′ with ScoreF1(pi) ≤ 2 for all prefixes pi
of all plays consistent with σ′ [17] . Thus QuantMuller(F0,F1)(σ′) ≤ 2.
We now show how to reduce quantitative Muller games to vertex-ranked sup-safety games based on
previous work by Neider et al. [22]. Recall that a safety game is a very simple qualitative game, in which
it is Player 0’s goal to avoid a certain set of undesirable vertices. In order to construct the safety game,
we define an equivalence relation over play prefixes, such that two play prefixes are equivalent if they
have the same accumulator and the same score with respect to all F ∈ F1. The constructed safety game
uses as vertices the equivalence classes of all play prefixes that have a cost of at most 3 for all F ∈ F1.
Moreover, it mimics plays pi of cost at most 3 in the Muller game by moving to some vertex pi′ such that
the score and the accumulator are equal in pi and pi′ for all F ∈ F1. We show how to lift this qualitative
construction to the setting of quantitative games by providing a quantitative reduction from quantitative
Muller games to vertex-ranked sup-safety games.
Lemma 7. Let G be a quantitative Muller game with vertex set V . There exists a memory structure M
of size at most (|V |!)3 and a vertex-ranked sup-safety game G′ such that G ≤3M G
′.
Proof. Let G = (A,Cost) with vertex set V and Cost = QuantMuller(F0,F1). We say that two
play prefixes pi and pi′ are F1-equivalent if they end in the same vertex and if, for each F ∈ F1, we
have AccF (pi) = AccF (pi
′) and ScoreF (pi) = ScoreF (pi
′). In this case, we write pi ≈F1 pi
′. For each play pi,
we denote the F1-equivalence-class of pi by [pi]≈F1 . Let Plays≤2 = {pi ∈ V
∗ | ScoreF1(pi) ≤ 2}. For the
sake of readability, we omit the F1 for the remainder of this proof wherever unambiguously possible.
We define the set of memory states M = Plays≤2
/
≈ ∪{⊥}, the initial memory state mI = [vI ], and
the update function Upd as Upd(⊥, v) = ⊥, Upd(pi, v) = [piv] if ScoreF1(piv) ≤ 2 and Upd(pi, v) = ⊥
otherwise. We obtain |M | ∈ O(|Plays≤2
/
≈|). Since |Plays≤2
/
≈ | ≤ (|V |!)3, the memory structure M
is indeed of exponential size in |V | [22].
A straightforward induction shows that this memory structure tracks the score of a play precisely as
long as it does not exceed the value two on any prefix. More formally, it satisfies the following invariant:
Let pi = v0 · · · vj be a play prefix in G such that ScoreF1(v0 · · · vk) ≤ 2 for all k with 0 ≤ k ≤ j.
Moreover, let Upd+(pi) = pi′. Then pi ≈ pi′.
Recall Safety(S) = {v0v1v2 · · · ∈ V ω | ∀j ∈ N. vj /∈ S}. We define the vertex-ranked sup-safety game G′ =
(A×M,Ranksup(Safety(V ×{⊥}), rk)), with rk(v, pi) = ScoreF1(pi) for all pi ∈ Plays≤2, and rk(v,⊥) = 3.
Let Cost′ = Ranksup(Safety(V × {⊥}), rk). Clearly, the first two items of the definition of G ≤3M G
′
hold true. Moreover, G′ is indeed of exponential size in |G|, as argued above. It remains to show Cost(ρ) =
Cost′(ext(ρ)) for all ρ with Cost(ρ) < 3 and Cost′(ext(ρ)) ≥ 3 for all other ρ.
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First, let ρ = v0v1v2 · · · be some play with Cost(ρ) ≤ 2 and let ext(ρ) = (v0,m0)(v1,m1)(v2,m2) · · · .
Then ScoreF1(v0 · · · vj) ≤ 2 for all j ∈ N. Thus, due to the invariant above and the definition of rk, we
obtain rk(vj ,mj) = Score(v0 · · · vj) for all j ∈ N, which implies Cost
′(ext(ρ)) = Cost(ρ).
Towards a proof of the latter statement, let ρ = v0v1v2 · · · be a play with Cost(ρ) ≥ 3 and let j be
the minimal position such that Cost(v0 · · · vj) = 3. Since Cost(v0 · · · vj) = ScoreF (v0 · · · vj) for some F ∈
F1 and since the score is at most incremented during each step, we obtain ScoreF (v0 · · · vj−1) = 2
and AccF (v0 · · · vj−1) = F\{vj}. Let Upd
+(v0 · · · vj−1) = pi′. Due to the invariant we obtain ScoreF (pi′) =
2 and AccF (pi
′) = F \ {vj}. Thus, ScoreF (pi′vj) = 3, hence ext(v0 · · · vj) = (v0,mI) · · · (vj ,⊥), which
implies ext(ρ) /∈ Safety(V × {⊥}), which in turn yields Cost′(ext(ρ)) =∞ > 3.
Thus, in order to solve a quantitative Muller game with respect to some b, it suffices to solve a vertex-
ranked sup-safety game G′ with respect to b. Recall that this is only constructive if Player 0 wins G′ with
respect to b < 3, i.e., only in this case are we able to construct a strategy with cost at most b for her
in G. Otherwise, Theorem 2 yields the existence of a strategy of cost∞ for Player 1 in G, but we cannot
construct such a strategy from his strategy of cost greater than two in G′. This is consistent with results
of Neider et al. [22] and with the fact that Muller conditions are in a higher level of the Borel hierarchy
than safety conditions, i.e., qualitative Muller games cannot be reduced to safety games.
We can, however, solve the resulting vertex-ranked safety game with respect to a given bound by solv-
ing a qualitative safety game as shown in Theorem 4. Using this reduction together with the framework
of quality-preserving reductions, we obtain an upper bound on the complexity of solving quantitative
Muller games with respect to some bound b.
Theorem 7. The following problem is in ExpTime: “Given some quantitative Muller game G and some
bound b ∈ N, does Player 0 win G with respect to b?”
Proof. Given G, we first construct the vertex-ranked sup-safety game G′ as shown in Lemma 7. Recall
that G′ contains at most (|V |!)3 vertices. Due to Theorem 4 and the fact that safety games can be solved
in linear time in the number of vertices, G′ can indeed be solved in time at most (|V |!)3 with respect to
a given bound b, which is exponential in the number of vertices |V | of G.
As discussed in Section 4.1, since both players have positional winning strategies in safety games,
Lemma 7 yields that if Player 0 has a strategy with cost at most 3 in a quantitative Muller game G, then
she also has a strategy in G with the same cost and of size at most exponential in |V |. Moreover, finding
the minimal b such that Player 0 has a strategy of cost at most b in G requires solving at most three
safety games of exponential size in |V |. Thus, the optimization problem for quantitative Muller games
can be solved in exponential time.
5.3 Fault Resilient Strategies for Safety Games
We now demonstrate the flexibility and versatility of vertex-ranked games in their own right. To this
end, we consider the problem of synthesizing a controller for a reactive system that is embedded into
some environment. This setting is typically modeled as an infinite game in which Player 0 and Player 1
take the roles of the controller and of the environment, respectively. Here, we consider safety games, i.e.,
we assume that the specification for the controller is given as a game in which it is the aim of Player 0
to keep the play inside a safe subset of the vertices.
Dallal et al. [14] argue that this setting is not sufficiently expressive to correctly model a real-world
scenario, since it assumes that Player 0 can accurately predict the effect of her actions on the state of
the system. In a realistic setting, in contrast, faults may occur, i.e., an action chosen by a controller may
be executed incorrectly, or it may not be executed at all.
In order to model such faults, Dallal et al introduce arenas with faults AF = (V, V0, V1, E, F, vI),
which consist of an arena (V, V0, V1, E, vI) and a set of faults F ⊆ V0 × V . In such an arena, whenever
it is Player 0’s turn, say at vertex v, a fault (v, v′) ∈ F may occur, resulting in the play continuing
in vertex v′ instead of that chosen by Player 0. Moreover, Dallal et al. consider safety conditions, i.e.,
qualitative winning conditions of the form Safety(S) = {v0v1v2 · · · | ∀i ∈ N. vi ∈ S} for some S ⊆ V .
Hence, it is the aim of Player 0 to keep the play inside the “safe” set of vertices S. If the play leaves the
set S, it is declared winning for Player 1. The task at hand is to compute a fault-resilient strategy for
Player 0 that forces the play to remain inside S and that can “tolerate” as many faults as possible.
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Safety games without faults are solved by a simple attractor construction: As soon as the play
enters W1 = Attr1(V \ S), Player 1 can play consistently with his attractor strategy towards V \ S in
order to win the play. Thus, it is Player 0’s aim to keep the play inside W0 = V \W1.
Dallal et al. solve the problem of computing fault-resilient strategies for safety games by adapting
the classical algorithm for solving safety games to this setting. In doing so, they obtain a value val(v)
for each vertex v that denotes the minimal number of faults that need to occur in order for the play to
reach W1, if Player 0 plays well. Furthermore, they show that val can be computed in polynomial time
in |V |. Finally, due to the existence of positional winning strategies for both players in safety games,
they obtain val(v) ∈ [n] ∪ {∞} for all v ∈ V . Then, a fault-resilient strategy for Player 0 is one that
maximizes the minimal value val(v) witnessed during any play. Dallal et al. construct such a strategy on
the fly during the computation of val(v) [14].
This task can, however, easily be reframed as a vertex ranked game in the arena A = (V, V0, V1, E, vI),
which we obtain from AF by omitting the faults. In that game, we assign to each vertex the rank rk(v) =
|V | − val(v) if val(v) ∈ [n] and rk(v) = 0 otherwise, i.e., if val(v) = ∞. Then, Player 0 has a strategy
with cost at most b in G′ = (A,Ranksup(Safety(S), rk)) if and only if she has a winning strategy in the
original safety game with faults that tolerates at least |V | − b faults.
This formulation as a vertex-ranked game enables further study of games in arenas with faults. Here,
we require the winning condition to be a safety condition in order to compute val(v). In recent work, we
have shown how to compute this value for more complex qualitative winning conditions [23]. If val(v)
is effectively computable for a given qualitative winning condition, one can easily obtain fault-resilient
strategies by formulating the task as a vertex-ranked game as demonstrated.
Finally, the formulation as a vertex-ranked game yields a method to compute eventually-fault-resilient
strategies, i.e., strategies that are resilient to a large number of faults after a finite “start-up” phase. In
order to obtain such strategies, it suffices to view the resulting vertex-ranked games as a lim sup-game
instead of a sup-game and to solve it optimally as described in Section 4.2.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we have lifted the concept of reductions, which has yielded a multitude of results in the area
of qualitative games, to quantitative games. We have shown that this novel concept exhibits the same
useful properties for quantitative games as it does for qualitative ones and that it furthermore retains
the quality of strategies.
Additionally, we have provided two very general types of quantitative games that serve as targets
for quantitative reductions, namely vertex-ranked sup games and vertex-ranked lim sup-games. For both
kinds of games we have shown a polynomial overhead on the complexity of solving them with respect
to some bound, on the memory necessary to achieve a given cost, and on the complexity of determining
the optimal cost that either player can ensure.
Finally, we have demonstrated the versatility of these tools by using them to solve quantitative
request-response games and by showing how to solve the problem of computing fault-resilient strategies
in safety games via vertex-ranked games. This latter formulation enables a general study of games with
faults, even in the presence of more complex winning conditions than the safety condition considered by
Dallal et al. [14] and in this work. We are currently investigating how to leverage vertex-ranked games
for the synthesis of fault-resistant strategies in parity games.
Further research continues in two additional directions: Firstly, while the framework of quantitative
reductions and vertex-ranked games yields upper bounds on the complexity of solving quantitative games,
it does not directly yield lower bounds on the complexity of the problems under investigation. Consider,
for example, the problem of solving parity games with costs with respect to some bound, which isPSpace-
complete [29]. It is possible to reduce this problem to that of solving a vertex-ranked parity game of
exponential size and linearly many colors similarly to the reduction presented in this work, which yields
an ExpTime-algorithm. It remains open how to use quantitative reductions to obtain an algorithm for
this problem that only requires polynomial space.
Secondly, another goal for future work is the establishment of an analogue to the Borel hierarchy
for quantitative winning conditions. In the qualitative case, this hierarchy establishes clear boundaries
for reductions between infinite games, i.e., a game whose winning condition is in one level of the Borel
hierarchy cannot be reduced to one with a winning condition in a lower level. Also, each game with a
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winning condition in the hierarchy is known to be determined [20]. To the best of our knowledge, it is
open how to define such a hierarchy for quantitative winning conditions which exhibit similar properties.
Acknowledgements I would like to thank Martin Zimmermann for many fruitful discussions.
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